Reflections: A year on from the coup in Myanmar, what consequences have the Tatmadaw faced?
In April 2021, I wrote an article for Strife blog (published May 2021 — link below) in which I analysed the consequences for Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, following its overthrow of Aung San Suu Kyi’s popular democratically elected government in February 2021.
In the article I concluded that although the coup may have preserved the Tatmadaw’s immediate political interests, it would likely have major consequences for the military’s long-term prospects of retaining its dominant position within Myanmar’s state and society.
Now, a year on from the 1st February coup, it seems apt to reflect on the arguments, and predictions, I made nine months ago. Given the timeframe, I will mostly focus on the short-term consequences, but I will also endeavour to examine some evidence of developing long-term implications.
Short term consequences
In my original article, I concluded that in the short-term, with the Tatmadaw unlikely to change course, reluctant Chinese support and regional divisions would allow it to ride out the wave of international condemnation. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, despite growing public anger the military’s willingness to use repression would likely enable it to achieve its immediate objectives.
This has largely played out as anticipated. The Tatmadaw does appear to have succeeded in its short-term aims. It is still in power, its leader General Min Aung Hlaing is far from retired and prospects for constitutional reform are dead in the water. The Junta has faced strong international criticism but retains the tacit backing of Moscow and Beijing and so remains shielded from the worst of the external pressure. It is isolated. ASEAN, for instance, has excluded Junta envoys from attending summits following a lack of progress on a peace plan drawn up in April. Yet, the regional bloc’s influence is weakened by the divisions within its ranks on the issue.
However, the generals have not had it all their way. Even in the face of brutal crackdowns, there has been stubborn and sustained resistance to the coup. Anger amongst the population has not dissipated. In the cities, the Civil Disobedience Movement has undermined the institutions and legitimacy of the Junta. Myanmar’s healthcare system is a case in point. In many areas over 70% of health workers are believed to have fled underground, setting up a shadow system run by thousands of volunteers. An increasingly desperate Tatmadaw has doubled down, sending Myanmar spiralling deeper into crisis. The potential for civil war to engulf the country has greatly increased. Even now, battles rage between military units on one side and the People’s Defence Force and a range of ethnic militias on the other. All the while, the economy continues to sharply contract.
Long term consequences
It is of course too early to draw any firm conclusions regarding long-term consequences. Yet, we can still get a measure of the implications that appear to be developing.
Nine months ago, I suggested that by gambling on a coup, the military had thrown away the favourable political situation it had in Myanmar’s democracy and left it with no positive options once it reached its self-imposed deadline for new elections in 2022. I also argued that by overthrowing Suu Kyi’s nationalistic government and then cracking down heavily on the predominantly Bamar protestors, the Tatmadaw had severely undermined the legitimacy it had derived from its self-proclaimed role as the champion of Myanmar’s ethnic majority. Having long exploited this as part of its strategy to divide and rule the country’s numerous ethnic groups, it now ran the risk of uniting them against it.
Over the past year, there is evidence to suggest these consequences may well be beginning to play out. The rather predictable decision taken in August to extend the self-imposed deadline for new elections to August 2023 will have confirmed in the minds of many that the Tatmadaw has no intention of relinquishing power. That it backtracked on its promise after only six months has damaged its legitimacy even further by proving its lack of sincerity. Not that it has much by way of legitimacy left. Civilian protests amongst Bamar continue, with young people especially determined in their resistance, and cooperation between ethnic militias and Bamar majority anti-coup protesters has expanded. The slow descent into civil war and continued brutal treatment of protestors has undermined the Tatmadaw’s claim to be the ‘guardians of the nation’.
The outlook for Myanmar is bleak. With the Tatmadaw unwilling to relinquish power, but unable to consolidate their coup, there lies ahead a drawn-out disintegration, of the Junta’s legitimacy and power, and of the state of Myanmar itself.
