Invading Ukraine will backfire for Putin

Charlie Lovett
5 min readMar 4, 2022
Destroyed buildings in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv following Russian shelling (Source: State Emergency Service of Ukraine, dsns.gov.ua)

Just over a week into his invasion of Ukraine, it is becoming clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin has badly miscalculated. So much so that several commentators have questioned his grip on reality.

Firstly, Putin appears to have greatly underestimated the difficulty in invading and occupying Ukraine.

Militarily, the Russian forces have been caught off guard by the scale and determination of Ukrainian resistance, as well as the logistical challenges involved in conducting a full-scale invasion. The Russian army’s initial advances have been poorly organised and resulted in heavy casualties and waning morale. They have so far struggled to break stubborn Ukrainian resistance in major cities and have had less success than anticipated along the northern and eastern fronts. Ukraine’s army will likely be outmatched and outgunned in the long run, but they have made clear that they will fight for every square foot of their land — and the already significant number of Russian casualties suggests they will draw as high a cost from the invaders as possible.

Furthermore, even if the invasion is ultimately successful, if Putin believes he can simply install a puppet regime and be done with it then he is deluded. Pro-Russian leaders have been toppled before in Ukraine (in 2004 and 2014) and Putin’s actions mean the public is now more opposed to Russia than ever before. The Ukrainian people are not going to lie down and accept a Kremlin imposed regime, and thus, a bloody insurgency would almost certainly ensue. Indeed, the invasion appears to have sounded the death knell for any chance of a positive future relationship between Putin’s Russia and Ukraine. The two countries have deep historical ties, but Putin has almost certainly driven the Ukrainian people away from Russia for good, just as the Hungarians, Czechs and Slovakians have never forgotten the Soviet invasions of the 50s and 60s.

More significantly, Putin has failed to consider the domestic implications of the invasion.

Unlike the annexation of Crimea in 2014, there has been no outpouring of patriotic fervour. Instead, some Russian’s have risked arrest to protest in the streets, while a far larger number have quietly resisted by highlighting their unease with the situation. Significantly, several celebrities and even some state media personalities have spoken out against the war. Putin appears to have badly misjudged the mood of his people. A large part of the reason the annexation of Crimea proved popular was that it was achieved relatively bloodlessly. The narrative of a strong Russia regaining its historic territory while facing down a divided West was popular. This time it is different. Russians and Ukrainians share a deep historical connection, one emphasised by the Kremlin in its attempts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. However, this connection means that, regardless of how the Kremlin tries to twist it, for many Russians the idea of fighting their Ukrainian brothers and sisters is a deeply uncomfortable one. Moreover, a large number of Russians have friends and relatives in Ukraine, not only making them concerned about the fighting, but also providing them with testimonies which counter the Kremlin’s official line.

Putin, holed up in the Kremlin, surrounded by his kleptocratic sycophantic elite, does not appear to have appreciated that many ordinary Russians do not share his view that Ukraine must be kept under Russian influence at any cost. Kremlin propaganda may ironically be partly responsible for this. After years of preaching that Russia was not at war and only acting to protect minorities in Ukraine, the full-scale assault on Ukrainian cities seems jarringly out of place. The recent crackdown on independent and social media appears intended to reduce this disparity.

There is a strong chance that the invasion will damage Putin’s personal authority. Over the past two decades, Russia’s President had cultivated an image as a cool and calculated strategic thinker. Now though he appears increasingly erratic and paranoid and driven by ideology and perceived grievance. Ordinary Russians and those around Putin will take note. Given their unease around the conflict, the Russian people are unlikely to accept a bloody and prolonged occupation of Ukraine. They will also not appreciate the impact of sanctions and international isolation. Economic sanctions will hit the Kremlin’s kleptocracy hard and have a severe impact on ordinary Russian’s cost of living. The oligarchs are already feeling the squeeze on their finances and people have been rushing to withdraw their savings in foreign exchange as the rouble crashes. A growing number of oligarchs are attempting to distance themselves from Putin. The impact of sporting sanctions and private companies deserting the country will have an effect as well. If dissatisfaction with the Kremlin continues to increase, there may come a point when Russia’s political and military leaders decide to cut their losses and use Putin as a scapegoat as they look to protect their wealth and secure their influence.

Finally, the invasion is shaping up to be a strategic disaster for Putin.

In justifying the invasion, Russian officials have continually alluded to Russia’s ‘security concerns’, with these centred around the perceived ‘threat from NATO’. If acting against NATO really was a key motivation in the invasion of Ukraine, then it has totally backfired. The West will be more coordinated, less prepared to negotiate, and far more likely to lean into NATO. In fact, Putin has just reinforced NATOs relevance after several years of declining commitment. Germany has already carried out a massive U-turn and agreed to supply arms to Ukraine. Berlin has also announced an unprecedented rise in defence spending. In a matter of days, Putin has succeeded in doing what many thought impossible, he has united Europe around a common approach. Even previously sympathetic European leaders have fallen into line behind the need for a robust response. Russia’s strategic guarantee attained through its domination of European energy supplies has been sacrificed, with Western governments determined to wean themselves off Russian energy imports post-haste. By invading Ukraine, Putin has brought conflict, instability, and far more NATO troops to Russia’s borders, making Russia less secure both by his calculations and everyone else’s.

Alongside this, the invasion will reduce Russia’s influence in its periphery. Eastern European nations have been reminded of the value of their NATO membership, while Georgia’s ruling party has announced its intention to submit an application for EU membership ‘immediately’. More significantly for Putin, the invasion will push Russia even further from great power status, leaving it more dependent upon China, economically insignificant, and with reduced strategic assets. Rather than a global power, Putin has made Russia a global pariah. Wednesday’s vote in the UN General Assembly was a resounding repudiation of Putin’s actions — 141 countries voted for the resolution condemning the invasion and demanding the Kremlin remove its troops from Ukrainian soil. China abstained, as did key Russian allies such as Venezuela and Cuba, while Serbia (traditionally close to Russia) surprised many by voting for the resolution. China’s abstention was a sign of its unease over recent events — having spent decades reinforcing the sanctity of state sovereignty and non-interference, the Chinese will be greatly concerned over the damage Putin has done to this norm internationally.

Amongst all this, it is difficult to see any positive outcome for Russia. In fact, Putin’s actions appear to be backfiring so badly that it is difficult to conceive what he genuinely believed he could achieve through the invasion. Perhaps he really has lost touch with reality.

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Charlie Lovett

Charlie is a Politics graduate with an MA in International Conflict Studies from KCL. He primarily writes about UK Government policy and foreign affairs.